The systematic development of complex systems usually relies on a stepwise refinement procedure from an abstract specification to a more concrete one, that can finally be implemented. The use of refinement operators preserving system properties is clearly essential since it avoids properties to be re-investigated at each development step.
Introduction
In the recent years, security has gained more and more importance. As a matter of fact, many critical applications like, e.g., e-commerce, require high degrees of reliability and protection against external attacks. In a stepwise development process, it is important to consider security related issues from the very beginning. Indeed, considering security only at the implementation phase could lead to a poor protection or, even worst, could make it necessary to restart the development process from scratch. On the other hand, taking into account security from the abstract specification level, better integrates it in the whole development process, possibly driving some of the development choices.
A security-aware stepwise development, of course, requires that the security properties of interest are preserved during the development steps, until a concrete (i.e., implementable) specification is obtained. Thus, this refinement task should be carefully designed so that (also) security properties are preserved from the very abstract initial specification to the final one.
In this paper we focus on information flow properties (see, e.g., [8, 4, 5, 7, 13, 22] ), i.e., security properties that allow to express constraints on how information should flow among different groups of entities. These properties are usually formalized by considering only two groups of entities labelled with two security levels: high (H) and low (L). The only constraint is that no information should flow from H to L. For example, this security model can be applied to guarantee confidentiality in a system: it is sufficient to label every confidential (i.e., secret) information with H and then partition each system user as H and L, depending on whether such a user is or is not authorized to access confidential information. The constraint of no information flow from H to L guarantees that no access to confidential information is possible by L-labelled users.
Unfortunately, as noticed in [14] , most information flow properties are not preserved by usual refinement operators. This can be understood by noticing that the absence of information flow is usually formalized as a non-interference constraint [8] . The absence of information flow from H to L is achieved by requiring something intuitively stronger: what is done by entities operating at level H should never be observable by entities operating at level L. More succinctly, level H should never interfere with level L. This non-observability of high level events cannot be expressed as a property of single execution sequences. Instead, it is captured by requiring that each high level event moves the system into a state that behaves the same as before from a low level point of view. It is clear that if we refine the system by modifying the low level behaviour of some of such system states, we could invalidate this low level behavioural invariant, thus invalidating the non-interference constraint.
In this work, we propose a new notion of refinement for processes described through the Security Process Algebra (SPA). For this new notion we prove some interesting properties: (i) it is incremental, i.e., subsequent refinements are still a refinement; (ii) it is compositional with respect to SPA operators, i.e., it is possible to refine a process by refining its subcomponents.
Then, we consider a number of information flow properties proposed in literature and we express them through the following generalized unwinding condition:
Intuitively, when a high level action h is performed moving from S to S , then S should be able to simulate such a move by moving to a state S which is equivalent to S from a low level point of view. Condition (1) is parametric with respect to the simulating transition relation and the low level behavioural equivalence l . We show that, by plugging different relations and equivalences, we capture many different existing information flow properties.
This general form for expressing non-interference allows us to state a general refinement theorem: every refinement that preserves both and l preserves also condition (1). This theorem proves that every non-interference property expressed using (1) is invariant with respect to any refinement that preserves the two specific relations and l used to express the property. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the SPA calculus; in Section 3 we introduce the new refinement notion and we prove some general results on it; in Section 4 we give the generalized unwinding condition, together with the main refinement result, and we instantiate it to many existing information flow security properties; finally, in Section 5 we compare our work with existing literature and we give some concluding remarks. Along the paper, a simple running example of a binary memory cell is used to show how the refinement and security notions work. All the proofs can be found in the Technical Report available at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼bossi/sefm03TR.ps.
The SPA Language
In this section we report the syntax and semantics of the Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short) [5] .
The Security Process Algebra [5] is a variation of Milner's CCS [19] , where the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to specify multilevel systems. SPA syntax is based on the same elements as CCS that is: a set L of visible actions such that L = I ∪O where I = {a, b, . . .} is a set of input actions and O = {ā,b, . . .} is a set of output actions; a special action τ which models internal computations, i.e., not visible outside the system; a complementary function· : L → L, such thatā = a, for all a ∈ L. Act = L ∪ {τ } is the set of all actions. The set of visible actions is partitioned into two sets, H and L, of high and low actions such that H = H and L = L. We will use h to denote a generic high level action, and l to denote a generic low level action. The syntax of SPA processes (or systems) is defined as follows:
and Z is a constant that must be associated with a definition Z def = E. Intuitively, 0 is the empty process that does nothing; a.E is a process that can perform an action a and then behaves as E; E 1 + E 2 represents the nondeterministic choice between the two processes E 1 and E 2 ; E 1 |E 2 is the parallel composition of E 1 and E 2 , where executions are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complementary input/output actions, producing an internal action τ ; E \ v is a process E prevented from performing actions in v; E[f ] is the process E whose actions are renamed via the relabelling function f .
We denote by E the set of all SPA processes and by E H the set of all high level processes, i.e., those constructed only using actions in H ∪ {τ }.
The operational semantics of SPA processes is given in terms of a Labelled Transition System (LTS, for short). A LTS is a triple (S, A, →) where S is a set of states, A is a set of labels (actions), →⊆ S × A × S is a set of labelled transitions. The notation (S 1 , a, S 2 ) ∈→ (or equivalently S 1 a → S 2 ) means that the process can move from the state S 1 to the state S 2 through the action a. The operational semantics of SPA is the LTS (E, Act , →), where the states are the terms of the algebra and the transition relation →⊆ E × Act × E is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the inference rules depicted in Figure 1 . The operational semantics for a process E is the subpart of the SPA LTS reachable from the initial state.
The transition relation → is generalized to many steps as expected: If t = a 1 · · · a n ∈ Act * and E
a1

→ · · ·
an → E , then we say that E is reachable from E and write E t → E . Reach(E) denotes the set of processes reachable from E. We say that E is a finite state process if Reach(E) is finite.
Example 2.1
We consider an abstract specification M x of a binary memory cell. M x contains the binary value x and is accessible, by high and low users, through the four operations r h , w h , r l , w l representing a high read, a high write, a low read and a low write, respectively. Each operation is implemented through two different actions, one for each binary value. For example we write w h 0 and w h 1 to indicate a high level user writing value 0 and 1, respectively.
Notice that read (write) operations are modelled as outputs (inputs). In particular, process M x can send the stored Figure 1 . The operational rules for SPA value x through the two output actions r h x and r l x. Moreover, write operations are performed by accepting an input w h y and w l y (with y ∈ {0, 1}) and moving to M y, i.e., storing y into the memory cell. The operational semantics of processes M 0 and M 1 is depicted in Figure 2 .
Notice that M 0 and M 1 are totally insecure processes. As a matter of fact, no access control is implemented and a high level malicious entity (e.g., a Trojan Horse program) may write confidential information into the memory cell, through w h 0, w h 1. This information can be then read by any low level user through r l 0, r l 1. Information flow properties in Section 4 will aim at detecting this kind of flaws, even in more subtle and interesting situations.
The concept of behavioural equivalence is used to establish equalities among processes and it is based on the idea that two processes have the same semantics if and only if their behavior cannot be distinguished by an external observers. We report here a largely used equivalence, named (strong) bisimulation [19] , which equates two processes when they are able to mutually simulate their behavior step by step.
Definition 2.2 (Strong Bisimulation) A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over processes is a strong bisimulation if
Two processes E and F are strongly bisimilar, denoted by E ∼ B F , if there exists a strong bisimulation R containing the pair (E, F ).
In Section 4 we will give other (weaker) notions of behavioural equivalence that will be useful for defining security properties.
Refinement Operators
In this section we give a new notion of refinement for SPA processes. Intuitively, an abstract specification (given here as a SPA system) defines the set of possible (allowed) behaviours of a system. Refining a specification corresponds to choosing among these allowed behaviours, the ones that will be actually implemented. The idea is that a refined specification should never show behaviours that were not foreseen in the initial specification. To formalize this idea, we require that (i) each state of the abstract specification is refined to, at most, one state of the more concrete (i.e., refined) specification; (ii) the behavior of the refined states is simulated by the abstract states, i.e., it should always be possible to simulate an action performed by a refined state by the corresponding abstract state, and the two reached states should be still one the refinement of the other.
Refinement is formalized as a partial function from processes. A binary relation R is said to be a partial function when if both (x, y) ∈ R and (x, y ) ∈ R then y and y are equal. If R is a partial function we use the notation R(x)↓ to denote the fact that there exists y such that (x, y) ∈ R. In this case we also use the notation R(x) to refer to y. Similarly we denote by R(x)↑ the fact that there is no y such
To express the fact that the refined process should be simulated by the abstract one, we adopt the following notion.
Definition 3.1 (Simulation) A binary relation S ⊆ E × E over processes is a simulation if
We say that the process E is simulated by the process F , denoted by E ≤ F , if there exists a simulation S containing the pair (E, F ).
The relation ≤ is a preorder, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive. Notice that, if a relation S is such that both S and S −1 are simulations, then S is a strong bisimulation.
We now introduce our formal definition of refinement.
Definition 3.2 (Refinement) A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over processes is a refinement if
• R −1 is a simulation and
• R is a partial function from E to E.
We say that E is a refinement of F , denoted by E F , if there exists a refinement R such that R(F ) = E. The following example shows the difference between the notions of simulation and refinement. The condition that R is a (partial) function is useful to ensure that the refined process shows behaviors that are also shown by abstract one. 
On the other hand, in order to have F 2 F 1 we should consider a relation R such that R −1 is a simulation containing the pair (F 2 , F 1 ). Since It is worth noticing that our notion of refinement is decidable for the class of processes we are considering. In fact, for finite states processes both the requirements in definition 3.2 are decidable. Moreover, the complexity of the decision procedure is bounded by the complexity of checking if a process F simulates another process E. This can be done in O(n × m), where n is the total number of states of the two LTS's associated to E and F , and m is the total number of arcs (see [10] ). The following proposition follows immediately from the definition of refinement. It states that a sequence of actions performed by a refined state can always be simulated by the corresponding abstract state, and the two reached states are (still) one the refinement of the other. This is what we expected by our definition: all the behaviours of the refined process are simulated by the abstract process.
there exists F such that R(F ) = E and F t → F .
Example 3.5
Consider again the memory cell M x of Example 2.1. We noticed that such a process is not secure as a direct information flow from high to low level is possible.
A standard way to protect confidential data is to apply the multilevel security model of [1] . First, we need to assign a security level to any information containers (called objects); then the following access control rules are imposed: (i) no low level user can read from high level objects; (ii) no high user can write into low level objects. Indeed, these are the only two (direct) ways for leaking confidential information. M x can be refined both into a high level cell M h x, by eliminating any low level read operation (rule (i)),
and into a low level cell M l x, by eliminating any high level write operation (rule (ii)):
It is easy to see that M h x M x and M l x M x, for each x ∈ {0, 1}, by considering the following two refinements:
In Section 4, we will show how to prove that M h x and M l x are secure, i.e., that they do not allow any information flow from high to low level.
The next theorem states that the composition of two refinements is still a refinement. We denote by • the partial function composition, i.e., (
This guarantees that our notion of refinement can be used in a stepwise refinement construction of a process. Theorem 3.6 Let R 1 and R 2 be two refinements. Then
Hence, is a transitive relation. Since it is immediate to prove that is reflexive, we get that is a preorder.
Using Definition 3.2 we can introduce refinements which sound counter-intuitive, e.g., a refinement R with R(F )↓, R(F ) ↓, and such that F reaches F but R(F ) does not reach R(F ). We have that E is a refinement of F . A relation R which proves that E refines F is the following R = { (F, E), (c.0, c.0), (0, 0) }. This refinement is not intuitive, since it "does not preserve the reachability on its domain". A more natural refinement would be R = {(F, E), (0, 0)}.
The following proposition states that if a process E refines a process F , there exists a refinement R (F,E) which behaves "correctly" with respect to the notion of reachability.
Proposition 3.8 Let E, F ∈ E be two processes. If E F and R is a refinement containing the pair (F, E), then the relation R (F,E) = R ∩ (Reach(F ) × Reach(E)) is a refinement such that: R (F,E) (F ) = E and if R (F,E) (F )↓, then F ∈ Reach(F ) and E ∈ Reach(E).
Let R F be the set of processes E such that E F . Since is a preorder on E, induces a preorder on R F . Notice that is not a partial order since it is not antisymmetric, as shown in the following example. If F is a finite state process and E is such that both F refines E and vice-versa, then F and E are strongly bisimilar. This result does not hold for infinite state processes.
Proposition 3.10 Let F, E ∈ E, with F finite state. If F E and F E, then F ∼ B E.
Proposition 3.10 implies that if F is a finite state process, induces on R F , up to strong bisimulation, a partial order with top element F and bottom element 0. This agrees with our intuition that F is the "largest" refinement for F .
Some natural refinements can be obtained by applying the basic CCS operators. In particular, the operation of restriction can be used to build refinements.
Example 3.11 For all process E and for all set of actions v ⊆ L, the process
E\v is a refinement of E, i.e., E\v E. In fact, it is easy to prove that the relation
The following result explicates the relations between our notion of refinement and the basic CCS operators. It allows us to incrementally build refinements by combining refinements of process components. It shows also how to get the refinement of a process by refining just part of it.
Theorem 3.12 Let F, G, E, I ∈ E.
Let R be a refinement containing both (F, E) and (G, I).
Corollary 3.13 Let F, G, E, I
∈ E be such that there exists a refinement containing both (F, E) and (G, I) . Then:
Unwinding Based Security Properties and Refinement
In this section we consider various information flow security properties which can be characterized in terms of unwinding conditions and we identify sufficient conditions to be satisfied by our refinement operators in order to preserve them. We consider a class of unwinding conditions. Informally, these conditions require that whenever a high level action can be performed from a state E reaching a state E , there exists a state E which for the low level user is indistinguishable from E and which is locally connected to E, given a suitable notion of connectivity. Since an unwinding condition can be seen as a sufficient condition for many security properties, its preservation under refinement implies the preservation of all the security properties it guarantees.
A Generalized Unwinding Condition
We give a uniform presentation of the properties we consider by introducing a generalized unwinding condition which is parametric with respect to two binary relations on processes: an equivalence relation, l , which represents the low level indistinguishability and a transition relation, , which characterizes the local connectivity required by the unwinding condition.
Definition 4.1 (Generalized Unwinding) Let
l and be two binary relations on E × E. We define W( l , ) as
The generalized unwinding condition is based on two binary relations on processes. Thus in order to preserve it we can just check the preservation under refinement of the low level observation and the connectivity relation. For total functions this means to look for a congruence with respect to the two relations. Since refinements are partial functions we require that also undefined (↑) is preserved.
Definition 4.2 (Refinement preserving ) Let be a binary relation on E × E and R be a refinement. We say that R is a refinement preserving if for all G, G such that G G then either both R(G)↑ and R(G )↑ or both R(G)↓ and R(G )↓ and R(G) R(G ).
The preservation under refinement of the two relations l and is sufficient for guaranteeing the preservation under refinement of the W( l , ) property. 
The next lemma shows that the composition of two refinements preserving a given binary relation still preserves the same relation. That offers us a condition to preserve W( l , ) under subsequent refinements.
Lemma 4.4
Let be a binary relation on E and R 1 and R 2 be two refinements preserving . Then R 1 • R 2 is still a refinement preserving .
Properties based on Unwinding Conditions
Many security properties can be characterized as suitable instances of our generalized unwinding condition as shown in [2] . Here we consider both properties based on bisimulation (named, P BNDC , SBNDC , and CP BNDC ) and properties based on trace equivalence (named, SNDC ). The first three properties implies the well-known BNDC property [4] while the last one implies NDC [4] (or, equivalently, NF [20] ) and, in the deterministic case, PSP [23] .
Bisimulation based Security Properties
Each of the three properties based on bisimulation we consider in this section imply Bisimulation based Non Deducibility on Composition (BNDC, for short), a security property introduced in [4] which aims at guaranteeing that no information flow from the high to the low level is possible, even in the presence of malicious processes. It is based on the idea of checking the system against all high level potential interactions, representing every possible high level malicious program. In particular, a system E is BNDC if for every high level process Π a low level user cannot distinguish E from (E|Π).
The low level observation of a process is formalized in terms of weak bisimulation on low actions. Weak bisimulation is similar to strong bisimulation, but it does not care about internal τ actions. It is useful to introduce some notation: we write E
* denotes a (possibly empty) sequence of τ labelled transitions. If t ∈ Act * , thent ∈ L * is the sequence gained by deleting all occurrences of τ from t. As a
τ =⇒ requires at least one τ transition whileτ =⇒ means zero or more τ transitions).
Given this notation, weak bisimulation is obtained from strong bisimulation by allowing a transition of the form a → to be simulated by a transitionâ ⇒. Two processes are weakly bisimilar on low actions when they are weakly bisimilar if we consider only low actions.
Definition 4.5 (Weak Bisimulation on Low Actions) A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over processes is a weak bisimulation on low actions
Two processes E and F are weakly bisimilar on low actions, denoted by E ≈ l B F , if there exists a weak bisimulation on low actions R containing the pair (E, F ).
Definition 4.6 (BNDC)
The properties P BNDC, SBNDC and CP BNDC are all sufficient conditions for BNDC. Moreover, differently from BNDC, they are persistent in the sense that if a process E satisfies one of them then all states rechable from E satisfy it. Here we define the three security properties as instances of our generalized unwinding condition. Clearly, since we are considering processes which are weakly bisimilar on low actions the relation l is instantiated by ≈ l B . As regards , it varies according to the different requirements. The security property called Persistent BNDC [7] (P BNDC, for short), which is suitable for analyzing systems in dynamic execution environments, requires that whenever a state F of a P BNDC process may execute a high level action moving to a state G, then F should be also able to simulate such high move through a sequence of zero or more τ moving to a state G which is equivalent to G for a low level user. Thus,
As stated by Theorem 4.3, any refinement preserving both ≈ l B andτ =⇒ preserves also P BNDC. Corollary 4.7 Let F ∈ E be a P BNDC process. If R is a refinement preserving both ≈ l B andτ =⇒ and R(F )↓, then R(F ) is P BNDC.
Example 4.8
We consider again the memory cell M x defined in Example 2.1. We noticed that such a process is insecure because of a direct information flow. This fact is correctly revealed by P BNDC.
In Example 3.5, we observed that this flaw can be repaired by refining the memory cell into a high and a low memory cell, defined as processes M h x and M l x, respectively. It is easy to see that
since there is no way for a low level user to distinguish between the two states. As a matter of fact, the only possible low level actions are the two write operations w l 0, w l 1 which, both in M h 0 and in M h 1, move the system into the same states. The fact that M l 0 ∈ P BNDC is even easier to prove: the only high level actions r h 0, r h 1 do not change the system state.
We have proved that high and low level cells are secure. It is now interesting to study how this property is preserved by further refining the processes. To this aim we apply Theorem 4.7. Notice that neither M h 0 nor M l 0 perform any τ transitions, thus the only condition that we should care about is that the refinement preserves ≈ l B . As a consequence, removing high level actions does not affect the security of the two systems. For example, if we allow the high level user to only reset the cell value to 0 (by removing the w h 1 . M h 1 branch), the resulting process is still secure. On the other hand, modifications of low behavior should be performed coherently in all equivalent states. For example, the refinement
in which the low level user can reset to 0 the high level cell, only when the cell contains value 1 (notice that in N h 0 no low level write operations are allowed) is not preserving ≈ l B . It is easy to see that N h 0 ∈ P BNDC . The fact that N h 0 is not P BNDC reveals a slightly subtle information flow due to the fact that a low level user may track the content of the high level cell by trying to reset it: every time the reset succeeds the low level user can conclude that the cell contained value 1. A correct refinement achieving the same low level reset behavior described above, should include the branch
The property Strong BNDC (SBNDC, for short) has been introduced in [4] as a sufficient condition for verifying BNDC. It just requires that before and after every high step, the system appears to be the same, from a low level perspective. It is stronger than P BNDC and it can be defined through unwinding conditions as follows (see [2] ).
where ≡ is the identity relation on processes.
If a refinement preserves the low level observation of a process, it preserves the SBNDC security property. Both P BNDC and SBNDC are compositional with respect to almost all the SPA operators but they are not compositional with respect to the nondeterministic choice operator. This is not much surprising since security properties are, in general, not preserved under composition [16] . However, compositionality results are crucial for making the development of large and complex systems feasible [17, 18, 15] . The interest in the class of Compositional P BNDC processes (CP BNDC, for short) derives from the fact that it is fully compositional (i.e., it is compositional also with respect to the nondeterministic choice). CP BNDC can be defined as follows (see [2] ): 
Conclusion and Related Works
In this paper we presented a new notion of refinement for processes described as terms in the Security Process Algebra (SPA). We proved some basic important properties like incrementality of the refinement process and compositionality with respect to SPA operators. Moreover, we showed how to check preservation under refinement for a variety of information flow properties proposed in literature.
Paper [14] is undoubtedly very related to our work. In such a paper, Mantel gives some conditions under which refinement preserves information flow properties. There are, however, appreciable differences with our work: First, we consider systems expressed in a process calculus, while Mantel consider event systems; more importantly, we focus our attention to bisimulation-based properties while Mantel only considers trace-based models; more specifically, in [14] it is assumed that processes have a deterministic transition system while here processes may show any nondeterministic behavior. Due to these differences, the notion of refinement we propose is quite different with respect to the one of [14] , where refinement is simply formalized as trace inclusion. Our generalized unwinding condition is indeed a generalization of the one proposed in [14] and, in Section 4.2.2, we have shown that some of Mantel's results can be given as instances of our general refinement theorem.
Another interesting related work is [12] , where Lowe gives a new non-interference notion for quantifying the amount of information-flow in a system described as a CSP process. The proposed notion is based on the NDC property considered here. Quite interestingly, Lowe observes that NDC is not closed under CSP refinement, and he solves this problem by requiring, for a system to be secure, that all of its refinements are secure (i.e., by closing the property under refinement). Here, we take the dual approach of imposing constraints on refinements, instead of strengthening the security properties. It would be interesting to see if the notion of information-flow of [12] can be revisited by considering only "secure" refinements, as done in this work.
Other important works on refining non-interference are [11, 21, 22, 9] . As observed in [14] , in [11] it is given a method for making a specification secure after it has been sufficiently refined. This differs by our approach where we intend to prove non-interference guarantees at the beginning of the refinement process. In [21] , instead, confidentiality statements are proved from scratch after refinement, i.e., there is no result of preservation of confidentiality. In [22] , it is given a notion of non-interference that is preserved under CSP refinement. Differently from our approach, such a notion requires that processes are deterministic from a low level point of view. A detailed comparison between NDC-like properties and the notions proposed in [22] can be found in [3] . Paper [9] , similarly to our work and [14] , requires that refinement preserves some relations between processes. However, differently from what we do, only traces are considered.
